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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most significant criticisms levelled at deliberative democracy is that it is an 
irrelevant, utopian and counterfactual ideal because it is unachievable in modern, large 
and complex societies.1  In order to sufficiently explore the issues of institutionalization, 
this paper is unable to review its normative arguments and it therefore starts from the 
premise that deliberative democracy is normatively desirable. However, in order to 
achieve normative goals deliberative democracy needs ‘devices’ or institutions to 
‘enact’ it,2 and to ‘bring it down to earth’.3 The belief here is that an associational 
democracy can make important contributions to achieving this, specifically by enabling 
deliberative democracy to adapt to, and overcome, many of the aspects of social 
complexity that include increased social pluralism, scale, inequality of deliberative and 
political skills and resources, the increasing reliance on specialists, and globalisation, 
that form such significant barriers to its institutionalisation.  
 
This suggestion is linked to key functions of democracy that secondary associations, 
located in civil society, are particularly apt to fulfil. It is argued here that they are 
suitable locations for governance, providing the principle of subsidiarity is applied; that 
they can provide effective information and representation; increase and improve the 
provision of information; which enables them to contribute to public discourses in the 
public sphere; and can foster key political and civic skills and dispositions. However, 
not all associations will be able to fulfil all the functions that are attributed to them in 
this article. The fact that they are apt to fulfil one function may well mean they are 
unsuitable to fulfil another, with some types of secondary association hindering 
democracy, rather than promoting it.4 5  This variability in the suitability of associations 
to fulfil these key democratic functions is not essentially a problem, providing there is a 
diversity of specialised associations to form, what Warren terms a ‘democratic ecology 
of associations’, which means all the functions can still be fulfilled.6   
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More significant problems for an associational democracy, to effectively contribute to 
the institutionalization of deliberative democracy, are the current socio-economic 
inequalities prevalent in the current associational system, the difficulty of ensuring 
associations are themselves deliberatively democratic and linking deliberations within 
the associational system with broader collective decisions. Therefore, an associational 
model is just one possibility that, in a deliberative democracy, would have to be 
combined with a whole array of other institutions that also fostered key features of 
deliberation and democracy and helped it adapt to social complexity. In this sense, 
secondary associations are far from the whole solution, but the argument here is that 
they are an important, and necessary, part of that solution.  
 
THE BARRIERS OF SOCIAL COMPLEXITY 
 
Modern democracies are plagued by the problems associated with social complexity.7 
For Femia ‘social complexity’ is associated with the ‘number and variety of elements 
and interactions’ present’ and is increasing, primarily due to rapid changes in 
technology.8  This increase in social complexity has led to a decline in the relevancy, 
potency and ability of the nation-state to fulfil many functions, meet the needs of 
society and meet standards of democratic legitimacy and this has led to a reappraisal of 
the state across the world.9  
 
There are many aspects of social complexity, but this article will focus on those that are 
perceived to be the most significant barriers to deliberative democracy. The first of 
these is social pluralism as societies become ever more diverse and multicultural. An 
increasing perception of the state is that it excludes certain subordinate social groups. It 
is thought that the state’s universal approach is becoming increasingly unable to take 
account of differences between social groups and this has caused the corresponding 
retrenchment of the state as a welfare agency.10 Similarly, increasing pluralism has 
compromised the effectiveness of traditional, and formal, representative structures of 
liberal democracies, as their ability to include all social groups in decision-making has 
correspondingly declined.11 Increased pluralism also makes deliberative democracy 
unlikely, as it decreases the chance of reaching consensus on a common good and 
makes the inclusion of all relevant views harder to attain.   
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The second aspect is that modern societies are too big and contain millions of people 
dispersed over large geographical areas, which, has led to the centralisation and 
bureaucracy that characterises present nation states, and means decisions are far 
removed from citizens, with little potential for meaningful citizen participation. 
Problems of scale then also challenge the possibility of democratic deliberation with its 
reliance on participation in discussion. To have all citizens meet together and deliberate 
together, actually or virtually, is an empirical impossibility, especially if debates are to 
be inclusive and have depth,12 and we must also be wary of the available time citizens 
have to participate,13 with participation in deliberation being potentially more time 
consuming than other forms of participation, like voting. 
 
The third aspect of complexity is the inequality of resources and deliberative skills in 
society that are necessary to participate effectively. These democratic capacities are of 
two types:  civic capacities, which involve civic consciousness and trust, and 
deliberative skills, which include listening and analysing the assertions of others, and 
rationally forming and expressing ones own preferences in light of available 
information, in a manner that will be persuasive to others. It is then important to 
democracy that these skills be distributed widely and reasonably equally.14  
 
All these factors of social complexity are intensified, by the fourth, which is the 
growing need for greater levels of specialism in making decisions. New problems arise 
as society changes and, correspondingly, the state expands its functions. This combined 
with constant technological development has meant many more problems requiring 
technical solutions and, therefore, decisions are thought to require high demands of 
expertise. This, in turn, leads to a decline in informed participation, as being informed 
requires too much time.15 Present trends of increasing division of labour and new 
technologies has meant more citizens are incapable of participating directly in making 
decisions, which correspondingly leads to a decline in democracy.16 As well as making 
lay citizen participation in a deliberative democracy more difficult to achieve it has led 
to the decreasing legitimacy of state institutions, as they increasingly rely on experts for 
policy decisions, which has led to the proliferation of quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organizations  in, all aspects of, the policy process.  
 
The fifth, and final aspect to be considered, is globalisation, which has led to, and been 
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caused by, increasing global competition and integration, increasing technological 
diversity and rapid change and increased dispersion of the labour market.17  This has 
significantly hindered the potential for democratic control, especially at the level of the 
nation-state and it does not, and cannot, now monopolise the functions of governance.18 
Globalisation has therefore intensified problems of scale, as it is thought that many 
decisions now need to be made at a transnational, or even international level.19 This 
correspondingly increases the plurality of those affected by decisions, and therefore of 
those who should be included, either directly or indirectly, in decision-making. 
Identifying those who are affected also becomes more problematic. Furthermore, 
globalisation has contributed to inequalities and fuelled the need for expertise in 
decision-making. Together, these aspects of complexity provide significant barriers to 
the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy. However, associational democracy 
could be part of the solution, to which we now turn. 
 
OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS OF SOCIAL COMPLEXITY 
 
The conclusion drawn from these changing economic, political and cultural aspects of 
power, attributed to social complexity, by associationalists, is that the nation-state 
cannot remain as the key focus for political participation.20 It is argued that secondary 
associations provide an attractive alternative location for direct political participation 
and enable non-statist planning, decision-making, task fulfilment and interaction and 
provide channels for citizens entering into public discourse.21   However, the arguments 
that secondary associations, in an associational democracy, can alleviate many of the 
problems of social complexity affecting the state will not be reviewed in full, as these 
debates have been covered extensively in the literature. The further argument that these 
secondary associations can also be locations of participation, that will enable 
deliberative democracy to be meaningfully approximated, and therefore, also overcome 
the features of social complexity, has not been considered in full, and will therefore be 
the focus here.  
 
Associations as Mechanisms for Subsidiarity and Locations of Governance 
 
The exclusivity, and overstretching of the roles, of the principle fulcrums of liberal 
democratic institutions, political parties and representative legislative assemblies, has 
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led to a legitimation crisis for such structures and the state as a whole22  as the 
representative structures and bureaucratic administration that characterise the modern 
state ‘frequently operate in unjust, unaccountable and ineffective ways’.23 
Consequently, it is argued that in modern complex and globalising societies 
decentralisation and a plurality of organisations is required as a single, unitary elite 
cannot ‘exercise positive directive control’.24 For associational democrats, secondary 
associations are the solution, as they offer the potential for greater levels of 
inclusiveness in collective decision-making, by reducing the scale of decisions,25 as they 
operate at ‘accessible decentralised levels…’ in ‘which citizens can participate more 
fully and with greater knowledge of the affairs being discussed.’26 Potentially, then, 
decentralisation of roles to associations can help overcome both the problem of size and 
the need for specialists, through implementing legislation and fulfilling ‘quasi-public 
functions’ in support, or in place, of the state,27 removing much of the need for a 
‘central co-ordinating mechanism’.28  
 
There is nothing inherently democratic about decentralisation, as it can mean the 
restriction or elimination of legitimate participants from participation in decisions.29 
Decentralisation inevitably alters the nature of participation, which inevitably changes 
the nature of political conflict.30  Decentralisation is therefore only democratic to the 
extent that it ‘socialises conflict’ by linking collective actions to collective justifications 
that includes all those affected.31  Decentralisation, therefore, needs to be based upon a 
sound principle in order to provide guidance on who should receive devolved powers, 
on what policy areas, to what extent and on how it should be implemented.  
 
One such possibility is ‘subsidiarity’, with the guiding idea being that ‘decisions are 
taken as closely as possible to the citizen.’32  Consequently subsidiarity can bring 
collective actions and decisions closer to the citizens they affect and therefore aid self-
governance,33 making deliberative participation available to more citizens.34  The 
principle of subsidiarity is clearly compatible with both aspects of deliberative 
democracy: Deliberation, as ‘the continuous and active involvement of those directly 
affected in an ongoing discourse about the way their lives should be ordered is a key 
feature of subsidiarity.’35 Democracy, because a normative ideal of subsidiarity is that 
‘policies must be controlled by those affected, to ensure that institutions and laws reflect 
the interests of the individuals under conditions where all count as equals.’36  
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Therefore, the argument that deliberative democracy is counterfactual, because it cannot 
be implemented on a large scale, then does not prove the impracticality of deliberative 
democracy, but rather demonstrates the necessity for the units of decision-making to be 
reduced.  Subsidiarity is the most coherent principle to achieve this and hence 
deliberative democracy is unlikely to be achieved without it. Follesdal37 identifies three 
strong, mutually supporting connections, of how subsidiarity can enable deliberative 
democracy to adapt to features of social complexity: 
 
1. Reduction of Size:  Smaller units, such as secondary associations, are more 
suitable than larger units (communities/ nations) to both develop shared interests 
through deliberation and to secure their representation.38  As inclusion of all 
affected becomes more attainable, subsidiarity can also help address increasing 
social pluralism. 
 
2. Reduction of Domination: Subsidiarity would reduce the exterior domination 
over preferences of the members of the associations as it specifically prescribes 
the justifiable grounds for ‘exterior’ intervention, providing the ‘institutional 
space’ necessary for democratic preference formation to be based upon 
collective deliberation.39  
 
3. Reduction of Agenda: having less participants, and less issues on the agenda, 
means less information is relevant to the decision,40 making it easier to attain 
relevant information.  When the agenda is reduced, participants are, therefore, 
better able to understand what the available choices are and what these entail on 
any specific issue, and this helps address the need for specialists. Susbidiarity 
also helps overcome the social choice critique against democracy. For Arrow41 
the key to making a coherent social choice was domain restriction, and 
subsidiarity restricts the domain and therefore it can ‘limit the possibilities for 
cycling across alternatives’.42 Because the scale of preference rankings, which 
will need to be aggregated,43 is reduced, clear, unambiguous results can be 
produced. 
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Associations and Representation 
 
Even in a society where the principle of subsidiarity is prevalent, and secondary 
associations fulfil many functions, currently fulfilled by the state, not all functions of 
governance will be devolved to associations. Broader policies at local, national, 
regional, transnational and international level will be made, and citizens need to be 
represented in these processes if they are to be democratic. 
 
Representation has been seen as essential to democracies in order to address the 
problem of scale44 as it enables all to have their preferences included in debate, without 
all having to directly participate, but also helps overcome inequalities in participation as 
representatives are often thought to represent the interests of their constituents more 
effectively than the constituents themselves. In addition it relieves demands on 
excessive participation, while still ensuring citizen’s views and opinions are 
incorporated into decision-making processes. However, the mechanism of 
representation is key to the achievement of these aims and, the claim here is that, 
secondary associations are particularly apt at providing the relevant representation 
required for deliberative democracy as they enable a diversity of citizens with similar 
beliefs, preferences and needs to combine their voice and therefore increase the chance 
that they will be heard by other citizens, associations and relevant state agencies, in a 
detailed manner.45 Furthermore, they represent functional interests that are not 
territorially based which would go un(der)-represented through party politics.46  
 
Associations and the Provision of Information 
 
Much of the content that secondary associations represent is information that they have 
formed, collected and organised. They are particularly useful at this because they 
specialise in certain areas, which are, of particular relevance to their members, and 
therefore help alleviate the need for specialists in decision-making. Such information 
helps associations hold government officials and institutions accountable,47 and is likely 
to be more detailed, refined and abundant than information from others forms of 
representation.48 Furthermore, secondary associations create a division of labour in the 
collection and organisation of information, achieving economies of scale that enable 
citizens to acquire levels of information that they would be unable to obtain by 
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themselves and therefore contribute to overcoming inequality in information.49 In 
addition, due to their close involvement with their members, associations can provide 
information that would otherwise be unavailable to the state, such as experiential 
knowledge50 which is vital to ensuring inclusion of all social groups in the deliberative 
process.51  
 
In addition this representation of information enables co-ordination in a disparate and 
plural society. Environmental policy, provides a good example as it is currently limited 
due to the problems that the state has with ‘command, control and co-operation’, in 
establishing environmental public standards in the face of a diversity of sites, enforcing 
compliance to the standards, and gaining co-operation in setting standards.  Greater co-
operation from a plurality of associations could lead to more relevant, and detailed, 
specialist information about environmental damage and costs of environmental 
protection. They can provide co-operation from members to agreed environmental 
legislation and in the implementation of environmental protection methods.  
Associations can further help in the process of dissemination of knowledge and 
information about the new measures to other groups such as consumers; all in a manner 
unobtainable to state agencies.52 
 
Associations in Public Spheres 
 
In exchanging, representing and communicating ideas, information, beliefs and 
preferences, secondary associations generate deliberation and form a generalised debate 
in the informal public sphere. Public spheres can be characterised as spaces ‘in which 
citizens deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalised arena of 
discursive interaction’.53 Associations by participating in the informal public sphere 
bring in new speakers to public debate, changing the parameters of debate. 
 
The role of associations as communicators in the public sphere is an intrinsic one, as 
associations are established through communication between individuals themselves 
and because many try to influence the preferences of the state, general public and 
members of other associations by representing and voicing the views and interests of 
their members, trying to convince these other actors in the public sphere of their 
validity.54 To achieve this, associations must be able to ‘employ and appeal to norms of 
  
 
9 
publicity’; limiting their potential to act as strategic actors.55 These public spheres can 
appear at local, national, transnational, international or functional level, making them 
vital to democracy in the global era, as institutions and modes of governance and debate 
increasingly occur at these multilevels.56 They also help overcome the scale problem as 
the public sphere transcends elements of time and space, potentially enabling all to 
participate in an anonymous discourse.  
 
Schools of Democracy 
 
Liberal democracies are rife with inequalities of resources to form and participate in 
associations, many of which, both derive from, and cause, inequality in the distribution 
of democratic capacities, which are required for effective participation. However, it has 
been suggested that active and equal participation in secondary associations can provide 
the circumstances necessary for democratic capacities to be developed.57 In addition it is 
thought that associations can provide ‘the free spaces’ where ‘people are able to learn a 
new self respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills and values of 
co-operation and civic virtue’,58 which make citizens more likely to participate, 
cooperate and consider the interests of others, which are vital values to deliberative 
democracy, necessary to ground deliberative obligations. These include the provision of 
reasons that all can accept; listening and replying sincerely to all others; and trying to 
find a proposal that is acceptable to all through the modification of proposals in 
accordance with the reasons of others.59 This is important to the effective functioning of 
deliberative democracy, as we cannot be sure that citizens will always abide by these 
obligations, as in certain circumstances it will not be in their interests to do so.60  
 
The most recent and dominant articulation of the argument comes from Putnam,61 who 
argues that participating in associations creates ‘social capital’, an important aspect of 
which is ‘generalised reciprocity’, amongst their members, where by interests are 
broadened and become more public in orientation. If this is the case participating in 
associations can provide people with a sense of responsibility and ‘enlightened self-
interest’ as members become aware of their mutual dependency with members of other 
associations, appreciating the relevance of their interests, needs and preferences, and 
there by fostering the civic consciousness and trust that is necessary for collective 
action.62 In comparison with market and state relationships, which are based on 
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inequality, hierarchy and compulsion; associational relationships are more voluntary 
and equal, consequently the relationships are based upon consent, which deepens these 
civic capacities.63  Therefore, such trust, and concern for the public good, cannot be 
generated at the level of the nation state, but only in arenas like secondary associations, 
with powers decentralised to them.64 Furthermore, Putnam has argued that once these 
capacities of trust and civic virtue, have developed, then citizens can co-operate to solve 
collective problems, which in turn helps develop trust and civic virtue even further so a 
‘virtuous cycle’ is developed.65  
 
However, although trust and civic virtue could be generated within an association, it 
seems unlikely that they will be generated across society and between associations.66 
Interpersonal trust is by its very nature specific to its context and needs reciprocation to 
be directly experienced and so cannot ‘simply be transferred to others or to other 
contexts’.67 In addition, associations are by their nature exclusionary and competitive, at 
best providing the location for ‘shifting involvements’ of individuals.68 Cohen and 
Rogers’s more minimal claims therefore seem more accurate than Putnam’s, that 
associations can promote a ‘civic consciousness’, defined as a recognition and 
commitment to democratic procedures and norms as the basis for social co-operation 
and trust in the commitment of others to do the same.69  Nevertheless, ‘civic 
consciousness’ should still be sufficient to ground deliberative obligations. 
 
PROBLEMS FOR ASSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY 
 
Despite the potential of secondary associations to fulfil these key democratic functions, 
that contribute to enabling deliberative democracy in practice adapt too many of the 
features of social complexity, there are a number of significant problems that an 
associational democracy would face. These include the existence of socio-economic 
inequalities, the difficulty of democratising the internal structure of associations, and if 
this is achieved, linking these deliberations to broader decision-making mechanisms, 
necessary to avoid the mischief of faction. However, these problems can be overcome, 
to varying degrees, through the use of other institutions and mechanisms. 
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Socio-economic Inequalities 
 
The most significant problems for the associational system advocated here are the 
current levels of socio-economic inequalities that plague liberal democracies and the 
associational system itself.  
 
The current political processes of interest group competition are analogous with the 
market, with interest groups competing for the loyalty of citizens and money, which is 
then used in competition to lobby government, which contributes to distributive 
unfairness. Those with greater resources e.g. associations pursuing business interests, 
are best able to represent their interests and so policies continue to be biased towards 
these already dominant groups’.70  
 
Inequalities in power and money are perpetuated in associational membership.71 
Barriers to participation include the lack of income and education, and the presence of 
discrimination, which prevent equal participation in the associational system.72 
Individuals ‘do not simply “join” associations; they are recruited’ and ‘dispositions’ to 
join associations are affected by factors like ‘ghettoization’ and ‘chronic 
unemployment’, which results in people lacking the necessary resources to form their 
own associations and, or, the opportunities to be recruited into existing ones.73 
Therefore the greater the socio-economic level, the greater the level of associational 
participation and this reduces the potential of associations to instil civic virtues and 
political skills throughout the citizenry.74 
 
Similarly, the public sphere is plagued by inequality of access, which would affect its 
potential to fulfil deliberative roles in a democratic manner, enabling the discourses of 
the powerful to dominate and ‘crowd out everyone else’.75 Moreover, Fraser argues that 
socio-economic inequalities cause the cultural ethos, developed by socio-economic 
groups, to be unequally valued. She further suggests that in everyday life, and within the 
public sphere, such powers are magnified because inequality, in the political economy, 
affects opportunities for access to participation, therefore, public spheres are not, and 
cannot be, neutral and equally ‘expressive of any and every cultural ethos.’76 Fraser 
suggests multiple public spheres are the solution, as they provide subordinate groups 
with the arenas to deliberate and form collective preferences, goals, strategies and 
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identities away from the unequal influence of dominant groups.77 
 
Cohen and Rogers suggest limiting individual financial contributions to political groups, 
lowering barriers of entry to political processes and macro-economic measures such as 
‘inheritance taxes, income redistribution and subsidies for the organisation and 
representation of under-represented interests’.78  Young suggests there is a need for 
differentiated resource allocation to associations by the state, to address inequalities 
between social groups that have arisen from historical processes of disadvantage and 
oppression.79 Equalisation of resources also limits the role of threats of sanctions in the 
public sphere, in turn making reasons more prominent and therefore promoting 
deliberation.80 
 
Deliberative Democracy in Internal Associations 
 
If these socio-economic inequalities can be reduced then participation in associations 
could increase, and this article has attempted to establish that secondary associations 
could be key locations for deliberative democratic participation and governance. 
Moreover, if secondary associations are to fulfil their potential democratic functions 
then they need to have an internal deliberatively democratic structure: If associations 
are to be venues for more small-scale participation and democratic decision-making, 
then they must have a democratic structure. If the principle of subsidiarity is to be 
introduced then those associations that will be devolved powers must be accountable to 
those it serves, which requires an internal democratic structure.81  If associations are to 
provide authentic information and representation, it must be formed through the 
participation of all those who are said to be represented.82 If associations are to be 
schools of democracy and develop citizens’ capacities to participate deliberatively then 
this can only be achieved if members get to participate.83  
 
However, most secondary associations do not have a minimally internal democratic 
structure whether in the UK,84 Ireland,85 the USA86 or the Scandinavian democracies,87 
let alone a deliberatively democratic one. The same features of complexity are present 
within associations, and present similar barriers to achieving deliberative democracy 
within secondary associations, such as the iron law of oligarchy, time, number and 
disparity of members, although to a lesser extent than in nation states. 
  
 
13 
 
There is also the problem of whether citizens would want to actively participate in 
deliberative decision-making in associations. However, a fundamental belief for anyone 
who advocates a more participatory system is that if people are given real opportunities 
to participate in decision-making, that affects them, in a system that means their 
participation can actually affect those decisions, then most will participate, to an extent at 
least. This is even more likely to be the case if many of the socio-economic barriers, 
discussed above, are lessened. Consequently, if associations have a democratic internal 
structure, and if associations could influence public policy, or are devolved powers to 
fulfil key functions themselves, participation could be vastly increased. Nevertheless, if 
high levels of participation are to be maintained, then participatory demands must not be 
too excessive.  This is why a deliberative and associational democracy can only expect 
associations to be minimally deliberatively democratic. Moreover, innovative procedural 
designs are required to help overcome these problems.  However, these are problems that 
will be unique to each individual association and must be addressed by the association.  
No blueprint can be applied to such problems, as different measures will suit different 
associations.  
 
Joining Deliberation with Decision-Making and Avoiding the Mischief of 
Factionalism 
 
Democratising associations would be a significant achievement, but if democratic 
deliberation is located only in these associations, then we must be sceptical as to 
whether the resulting preferences could be actualised. For deliberative democracy to be, 
genuinely, institutionalised, it must link collective deliberation with decision-making.88 
This problem is overcome when decisions are devolved directly to associations to make 
for themselves, providing the associations are internally deliberatively democratic. 
However, as mentioned above, not all functions of governance will be devolved to 
associations, and broader policies will be required. Other institutions are, therefore, 
required to provide the link between the communication and opinions, formed through 
deliberation in the public sphere with decision-making. A variety of different 
institutional mechanisms have been advocated to make this link. For example, 
deliberative opinion polls and citizens juries have incorporated secondary associations 
as advisers to a randomly selected sample of citizens;89 Habermas looks to traditional 
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legislative assemblies to act as sensors to discourses emerging from the informal public 
sphere;90 and local, national, transnational and functional citizen forums, where a range 
of associations can participate to either make recommendations91 or form policy92 have 
also been advocated. Each has their relative strengths and weaknesses, and it is likely 
that a range of such methods are required, in different contexts, to link deliberation in 
civil society with decision-making at the multilevels of governance that exist in this 
global age.  
 
These deliberatively democratic institutions, that bring associations into decision-
making, are also required if the excessively narrow, and private, interests that secondary 
associations often promote, are to be compatible with the promotion of the common 
good. The presence of formal deliberatively democratic decision-making arenas, that 
include associations, can help to achieve this, preventing these associations from being 
too narrowly focused and factionalised.93  Such a situation is far removed from the neo-
liberal interest group system because rather than encouraging associations to pressure 
the state with private and selfish claims, it demands the associations formulate proposals 
and offer reasons, which the other associations could accept.94 This, in turn, would 
mean that an associational democracy did not lead to the mischief of faction and 
increased bargaining, but to the possibility of the advancement of the common good.95 
Factionalism will be further avoided because citizens will join a variety of associations, 
as people have multiple and crosscutting, and diverse, identities and interests.96 This 
will alleviate factionalism because ‘people are more likely to have some basis for 
understanding and empathising with others in societies where they inhabit crosscutting 
and overlapping roles’,97 as the discussion of civic virtue above suggests. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Features of social complexity present significant barriers for deliberative democracy to 
be meaningfully institutionalised. The claim here is that secondary associations, in an 
associational democracy, would help overcome many of these.  
 
Secondary associations provide routes to accommodating social pluralism as they offer 
suitable locations for decentralisation, which makes the inclusion of all affected easier 
to achieve. This factor combined with the increased levels, and greater dissemination, of 
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information that associations provide, aids co-ordination in a plural society. They are 
also able to represent a greater diversity of people than territorially based mechanisms. 
Association can, furthermore, generate civic consciousness in their members, which is 
desperately needed in plural societies. 
 
Secondary associations provide a passage for overcoming the barrier of scale as they are 
relatively smaller scale units that can enable citizens to directly participate in debate and 
decision-making.  This is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, which legislates 
for decisions to be taken at the lowest appropriate level to allow for those affected to 
participate and fulfil the task or provide the service they need and want. 
Decentralisation reduces the domain, making clear and unambiguous decisions more 
likely and therefore further reducing the problems caused by scale.  Associations 
represent their members, enabling more people to be represented and included in 
decision-making and public debates, which can lead to the development of public 
spheres, which can transcend elements of time and space. Through these public spheres, 
associations aid in the dissemination of information to large numbers of geographically 
dispersed people. 
 
Associations contribute to the more equal generation of key democratic capacities by 
providing the free spaces for citizens to learn and develop these capacities through 
participation on a small scale. Associations aid equality in democracy more broadly by 
providing representation, and access to public spheres, for a diversity of groups with 
specific interests and identities, that are not territorially based, and that, currently, tend 
to be un(der) represented. Again, economies of scale in the collection, and 
dissemination, of information are also achieved by associations. 
 
This last aspect also aids in the reduction of the reliance on specialists. Furthermore, if 
associations are devolved powers there is less relevant information, and greater 
knowledge of the issues, which in turn aids co-ordination. Associations provide 
specialist information themselves and provide experiential information that would 
otherwise not be available, therefore, countering the dominance of specialists in current 
policy processes. 
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Finally, globalisation is accommodated as associations are so flexible that they can 
operate at international and transnational level, developing public spheres there, and if 
structured appropriately, even contributing to the decision-making processes of 
international and transnational, formal, institutions. 
 
However, an associational system is far from perfect and faces many significant 
problems. The current level of socio-economic inequalities means some associations 
have far greater resources to achieve their aims, and have greater access to, and are 
more likely to have their views considered in, the public sphere. Furthermore, people 
from dominant social groups will find it easier to, and are more likely to, join and 
participate in associations. A range of measures including the formation of multiple 
public spheres, and differential allocation of resources to these groups, are essential if a 
deliberative and associational democracy is to be achieved. 
 
The approximation of deliberative democracy within the associations is difficult due to 
the same barriers of social complexity that affect its institutionalisation more broadly. 
Nonetheless, they are easier to overcome within an association, and innovative 
mechanisms, specific to the association’s context can achieve this, providing excessive 
participation demands on associational members are not made. Finally, these 
deliberations within associations need to be linked to a variety of formal deliberatively 
democratic decision-making institutions, to ensure both deliberation and democracy are 
combined and to avoid the mischief of factionalism. Associational democracy is 
therefore, in no way the sole solution to enabling deliberative democracy to overcome 
the barriers presented by the features of social complexity, but certainly offers 
significant contributions on this. If deliberative democracy is to be institutionalised 
effectively, associational democracy must be taken seriously, and inevitably seems to 
have many important roles to fulfil. 
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